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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH. By Raoul
Berger.t Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1974. Pp. 430
$14.95. Reviewed by Professor Charles A. Rees.t
"Executive privilege... is a myth. "--RAOUL BERGER.
"The doctrine of executive privilege.., is rooted in the Constitu-
tion, which vests 'the Executive Power' solely in the President .... "
RICHARD M. NIXON.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the
President has a qualified privilege for confidential communications.1
When the constitutionally protected interests of another branch of
government conflict with the privilege, however, a question is raised for
judicial determination. That is, the courts have the duty in a proper
case to define the scope of the privilege and to resolve the "competing
interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each
branch."2 In the particular case before it, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the privilege was outweighed by a demonstrated need for
evidence in a pending criminal prosecution. Thus, executive privilege
may have to be qualified by judicial commands for information.
The subject of Raoul Berger's Executive Privilege is whether the
privilege must yield to demands by Congress for information. That
matter has never been determined by the Supreme Court. The useful-
ness of Berger's book may, in large part, be measured by the extent to
which his conclusions about executive privilege vis-i-vis congressional
inquiry are consistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent conclusions
in Nixon about the privilege vis-a-vis court subpoena.
After examining the Nixon decision, this review will consider the
relevance of the decision to the problem of resolving competing claims
of Presidential privilege and congressional inquiry. Then, Berger's Ex-
ecutive Privilege will be analyzed and a tentative conclusion reached
about how those competing claims are to be resolved. Finally, Berger
and his other works will be viewed.
THE NIXON DECISION
In connection with the prosecution of the seven indicted "Watergate
cover-up" defendants, the Special Prosecutor moved to subpoena the
President for certain tapes and other material. The trial court, finding
that the Special Prosecutor made a sufficient showing to justify a
subpoena before trial, issued the subpoena. The President moved to
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1. United States v. Nixon, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (1974).
2. Id. at 3107.
quash the subpoena on the grounds that: (1) the dispute, being intra-
executive between the Special Prosecutor and the President, was not
justiciable; (2) the materials were privileged; and (3) the judiciary was
without authority to review the President's claim of privilege. The trial
court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the
subpoenaed items.3 The President appealed from the order to the Court
of Appeals. Upon petition of both parties, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari before judgement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court. After
disposing of preliminary issues, regarding its jurisdiction to hear an
order which was not "final", the justiciability of an intra-executive
dispute and whether the subpoena was unreasonable or oppressive, the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the President had a
privilege not to produce information relating to confidential communi-
cations subpoenaed in a pending criminal prosecution. First, the Su-
preme Court decided that (in the final analysis) it, not the President,
had the constitutional duty "to say what the law is" with respect to the
claim of privilege. Second, the Court found that there was a privilege
for confidential presidential communications, necessary, as a practical
matter, to the exercise of the President's enumerated constitutional
powers and consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. That
privilege was held, however, to be qualified, not absolute, in view of the
need for a workable government-specifically, the judiciary's constitu-
tional duty to do justice in criminal prosecutions. Third, the Court
identified the judicial system's needs for disclosure and held that, in the
case before it, they outweighed presidential privilege. Those judicial
(and public) needs include compulsory process to develop all relevant
facts in a pending criminal prosecution and to vindicate the defendants'
constitutional rights in a criminal trial to confrontation of opposing
witnesses, compulsory process of witnesses in their favor and due
process. In weighing privilege against disclosure, the Court concluded
that the consequences of rejecting the privilege in occasional criminal
prosecutions would have no significant harmful effect on the public's
interest in having candid and.objective presidential decision-making. On
the other hand, allowance of the privilege would have a significantly
harmful effect on the pending criminal prosecution by impairing the
function of the judiciary and violating the constitutional rights of the
defendants. Finally, the Court stated the appropriate protective mea-
sures to be taken by the trial court upon receipt of subpoenaed
materials: examination in camera by the trial judge, isolation of admis-
sible and relevant material for release to the Special Prosecutor, ex-
cision of material not meeting the tests of admissibility and relevance
and return under seal to the President, and scrupulous protection of
presidential confidentiality at each step.
In Nixon, the Supreme Court dealt only with that aspect of execu-
3. United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1974).
4. United States v. Nixon, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (1974).
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tive privilege relating to confidential presidential communications.' The
Court suggested, however, that in a case involving military, diplomatic
or national security secrets, which relate to the President's express
constitutional duties as Commander-in-Chief and (with the Senate)
maker of treaties, the public's interest in confidentiality would be much
weightier. Indeed, in such cases the President might even be able to
demonstrate that there should be no in camera disclosure to the court,
much less disclosure in a public trial.
THE PROBLEM
The Supreme Court in Nixon expressly reserved the question of
whether the President had a privilege not to produce information
relating to confidential communications demanded by Congress." The
problem with using Nixon as a precedent in such a situation was
recognized by the Special Prosecutor in briefing his case:
Because there is no legislative analogy to the historic judicial
duty to determine all questions of law necessarily raised by a
case or controversy, rejection of the claim of executive privilege
in the present case does not necessarily suggest any answer to
the distinct questions of the scope of the President's right to
stand on a claim of executive privilege vis-a-vis the Congress or
of the role, if any, of the courts in such a confrontation.
History provides a great variety of opinions on the relative
5. The opinion expressly limited itself to a claim of privilege in a pending criminal
prosecution, not in civil litigation. However, it would appear that the same principles
would apply in civil cases, that is (1) executive privilege would be qualified, not absolute,
(2) the courts would have a role in resolving competing constitutional claims and (3) the
interests in disclosure might outweigh the claim of privilege. Those conclusions seem
justified by dictum in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), which is cited with
approval by the Court in Nixon, and by precedents dealing with procedural due process in
civil cases.
In Reynolds a government claim of privilege for military secrets was sustained in a civil
suit, when the private parties plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of need for the
information sought by discovery. The Supreme Court reserved to the judiciary, however,
the final determination of privilege in such cases.
The interests of the judicial system and of private litigants in disclosure may be just as
weighty in civil, as in criminal, cases. Certainly, the judiciary's constitutional duty to do
justice is no less in one than in the other. Also, civil litigants have rights of due process
which include the rights of confrontation of opposing witnesses and compulsory process.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (semble). Even if the government is not involved as
a party, the exertion of judicial power in civil cases is sufficient to invoke the due process
rights of the private litigants. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. This question had earlier been resolved in favor of nondisclosure in the case of an inquiry
by the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, in view of the
critical "need to safeguard pending criminal prosecutions from the possibly prejudicial
effect of pretrial publicity." Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 523 (D.D.C. 1974). There, the court expressly reserved the




rights of the Executive and the Congress in such a situa-
tion...
The question of the value of the Nixon precedent in the context of a
Congressional demand for information was specifically considered in
the Report on the Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the
United States by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.5 The question was raised because the third Article of
Impeachment accused Nixon of unlawfully failing to produce materials
subpoenaed by the Committee. The Report, after noting the Nixon
holding that separation of powers could not justify presidential with-
holding of information from a criminal prosecution, concluded:
It is even clearer that the doctrine of separation of powers
cannot justify the withholding of information from an impeach-
ment inquiry. The very purpose of such an inquiry is to permit
the legislative branch, acting on behalf of the people, to curb
the excesses of another branch, in this instance the Executive. 9
The Report reserved the question of the limits of legislative power in
contexts other than impeachment." In the view of one committee-
man, Congressman McClory, the Supreme Court's conclusion, that an
7. Brief for Appellee at 53 n. 38, United States v. Nixon, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (1974).
8. 120 CONG. REC. 8967 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
9. Id. at 9026.
10. The Report unpersuasively concludes that judicial review would be inappropriate, where
an impeachment inquiry's subpoena for Presidential information was met-with a claim of
privilege. Id. at 9026-27. This conclusion was based on the arguments that (1) article I, § 2
of the Constitution vests "the sole Power of Impeachment" in the House of Representa-
tives; (2) the federal courts may lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a case; (3) the
subject is a nonjusticiable "political question"; and (4) in considering the question, the
courts would have to determine whether the subpoenaed material was relevant to an
impeachment inquiry, a question which would require a ruling on the scope of
constitutional grounds for impeachment which might conflict with the views of the House
and Senate.
The first, third and fourth arguments seem clearly contrary to the thrust of Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Supreme Court set aside the exclusion of a
member by the House of Representatives (a function specifically entrusted by the
Constitution to the House) for conduct not falling within the express qualifications for
membership set by the Constitution. See R. BERGER, IMPLcHMENr: THE CosnsrtoNAL
PROBLEMS 103-21 (1973), and I. BRANT, I ECHmExrl. TRIALS AND ERRORS 181-98 (1972);
contra, C. BLAcK, Im EAcIiiEN. A HANDBOOK 53-63 (1974), and COMM. ON FED.
LEGISLATION OF THE BAR Ass'N OF THE Crry OF NEW YORK, THE LAW OF PRESIDENIAL
IMPEACHMENT 36-43 (1974); contra, individual views of Berkovitch & Schwarz, Id., at
52-57. The arguments also appear to conflict with the recent restatement by the Nixon
court of the proposition that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."
With respect to the second argument, the report cites Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973), where statutory
subject matter jurisdiction was held lacking in an action by the Senate "Watergate
Committee" to enforce two subpoenas issued by it to the President. But, aside from the
strictly limited original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, all the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts is statutory. Article III of the Constitution provides at
least two bases for a statute giving the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear a
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absolute executive privilege would make the government unworkable
and would impair the role of the courts, applied with even stronger
force in an impeachment proceeding. The Congressman withheld judge-
ment on the question of whether national security or diplomatic
secrecy would justify the privilege in an impeachment proceeding.'
In the minority view of Congressman Hutchinson, and certain other
committeemen, the rationale of Nixon supported the existence of some
measure of executive privilege in the context of an impeachment
inquiry. In such an inquiry, the claim of executive privilege should not
be followed automatically by impeachment, but by contempt proceed-
ings in which the President would be permitted to show why his failure
to comply was not contemptuous.
1 2
In Congressman Froehlich's view, it followed from Nixon that the
conflicting claims of executive privilege and congressional demands for
information in an impeachment proceeding should be weighed, not by
either of the two contending branches of government, but by the
courts .
Thus, the better views expressed in the Report support the applica-
tion of the Nixon principles in a conflict between a general claim of
executive privilege and a specific congressional demand for information
in an impeachment inquiry: the privilege is qualified, not absolute; the
judiciary may properly review any such conflict; and resolution of the
competing interests may require disclosure of relevant information.
THE BOOK
Berger's Executive Privilege deals primarily with the President's with-
holding of information from Congress, not the courts. Berger does
suggest, however, that the case for congressional inquiry is much
stronger than the case for judicial inquiry, since it is within the province
of the legislature, not the courts, to investigate the executive branch.
Legislative inquiry into executive conduct is based on the traditional
legislative concerns of inquiry as a prelude to impeachment, oversight
of the conduct of war, accounting for expenditure of public moneys,
establishing a basis for legislation and ensuring the proper execution of
the laws.
Neither legislative inquiry nor executive privilege is expressly men-
tioned in the Constitution. Berger concludes, however, that legislative
case involving an impeachment inquiry's subpoena which is met with a claim of privilege:
the judicial power of the United States extends to cases "arising under this Constitution"
and to "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party". Congress has recently
enacted legislation authorizing the "Watergate Committee" to enforce any subpoena
issued to an official in the executive branch. Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (Dec. 18,
1973). That such lesislation might be unconstitutional as impinging upon the impeach-
ment power vested solely in the House is a variation of the first argument considered above.
11. 120 CONG. REC. supra, at 9057.
12. Id. at 9100.
13. Id. at 9107-08.
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inquiry, but not executive privilege, is implicit in the Constitution. His
conclusion relies heavily on an extensive study of British parliamentary
practice prior to the Constitutional Convention in 1787.'4 The case for
legislative inquiry is that: (1) at the time of the Convention, it was an
historical attribute of the power to legislate; (2) it was understood and
accepted by the Framers of the Constitution; (3) up to the time of the
Convention, it had traditionally accompanied the express power of the
legislature to impeach; and (4) it is the reciprocal of the President's
express duty under article II, § 3 of the Constitution to furnish
"information of the State of the Union."
On the other hand, Berger concludes that executive privilege was not
supported by pre-Convention precedent, nor mentioned in the delibera-
tions of the Framers, nor understood by them to be implied in the
separation of powers. Montesquieu himself acknowledged that the
legislature has the right to examine whether its laws have been exe-
cuted.' " To rely on the separation of powers to support executive
privilege is to assume the conclusion. It must first be established
whether there is a pre-existing power protected by the separation of
powers.
Berger rejects subsequent custom and usage as a constitutional basis
for the privilege' 6 on the ground that the President may not unilater-
ally expand his own powers, especially when that expansion would
impede the established legislative power of inquiry. In fact, Congress,
far from acquiescing in presidential withholding of information, has
usually pressed its inquiry.
Even assuming that custom and usage after 1789 could establish
executive privilege, Berger examines the precedents which various Presi-
dents have claimed constitute custom and usage. Those precedents
include: the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson
by Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a circuit judge, in the trial of Aaron
Burr; and Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst's claim that execu-
tive privilege might logically be extended by the President to apply to
every one of the 2,500.000 employees of the executive branch. The
14. This reliance has been criticized on the ground that precedents from the British system,
where ministers are directly accountable to Parliament, are not fully applicable in our
system, where there are three individual but equal branches. Pollak, Book Review,
Washington Post, June 30, 1974 (Book World), at 1. See also W. BAGE o, THE ENGLISH
CONsTrrtnMON 220-26 (Kegan Paul ed. 1925). Bagehot, in comparing the English and
American Constitutions, concluded that the ultimate authority in England was the House
of Commons, while in America there were many sovereignties: branches of the federal
government, state governments and people.
Pollak's criticism and Berger's use of sources, suggest the more general problem of
selecting "legislative history" for interpreting the Constitution. At one time or another,
Berger refers to English practice, colonial practice; early state constitutions and practice,
the Articles of Confederation, records of the Convention, The Federalist, proceedings of the
state ratifying conventions, contemporaneous construction by the First Congress and
President George Washington, and subsequent usage.
15. 1 C. DES. MoNTrmqsuu, THE Sprmrr oF THE LAws 187 (Philadelphia, 1802).
16. For a contrary view, based on Supreme Court authority, of the role of custom and usage,




author concludes that the precedents are self-serving misinterpretations
of the historical record and contrary to the American tradition of
openness in government.
Berger also examines, and rejects, the practical arguments for execu-
tive privilege. These arguments, and the reasons for their rejection, are:
(1) Congress has control over appropriations and legislation, and has
power to impeach, by which it may curb excessive claims of privilege-
these remedies being too drastic; (2) Congress may leak information it
receives from the executive branch--such leaks being no more common-
place than executive leaks and, when necessity arises, may be stopped
by limiting congressional access; (3) executive files containing deroga-
tory information should remain private--the executive branch having
misused such files and overstepped its investigatory authority, because
Congress has not exercised oversight; and (4) candid interchange of
opinions should be preserved-the risks of disclosing such opinions
being less than the risks of abuse, for example, Vietnam and Watergate.
In applying the Nixon precedent to a conflict between executive
privilege and congressional inquiry in order to determine whether there
is a privilege in the case of such an inquiry, Berger's work is not
particularly useful. While Nixon would appear to support a recognition
of the privilege in the congressional context, Executive Privilege, writ-
ten prior to Nixon, rejects the privilege outright. However, to the
extent there is some justification for the privilege, Berger would limit it
to confidential communications between the President and his imme-
diate advisers (excluding communications relating to illegal acts) and to
disclosure of certain subject matters which would actually injure the
public interest.
In using Nixon as a precedent in the congressional context, Berger's
analysis is helpful in at least two respects. First, he concludes that the
conflicting claims of executive privilege and congressional inquiry may
appropriately be resolved by judicial review. That is, a "boundary
dispute" as to separation of powers should not ultimately be deter-
mined by either of the disputants, but by the courts. The author
considers, and rejects, the limitations of the "case or controversy,"
standing and political question doctrines.
Second, Berger's analysis is useful in suggesting that congressional
inquiry, pursuant to functions other than impeachment, may be just as
weighty as an impeachment inquiry, and that all are more weighty than
judicial inquiries in pending litigation. (The House Committee on the
Judiciary likewise considered a congressional impeachment inquiry,
involving the maintenance of a "workable government," to be weightier
than a criminal prosecution, which was involved in Nixon.) Conse-
quently, the author makes no attempt to differentiate among the article
I functions of Congress which might conflict with executive privilege.
Indeed, he sees congressional inquiry as a whole, deriving initially from
the power of impeachment.
Based on Nixon and Berger's Executive Privilege, it may tentatively
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be concluded that a resolution, "in a manner that preserves the essential
functions of each branch," of conflicting claims of executive privilege
and congressional inquiry will involve the following considerations:
(1) the President has (a) a qualified privilege for confidential commu-
nications "necessary and proper" to the exercise of his enumerated
constitutional powers and (b) a somewhat broader specialized privilege
where military, diplomatic or national security secrets are involved; (2)
on a showing of need, pursuant to the legislative function, McGrain v.
Daugherty,' ' and a showing of relevance, Watkins v. United States,' 8
congressional inquiry may be expected ordinarily to outweigh the
former, but not necessarily the latter, privilege; (3) the courts may
properly resolve any dispute; (4) the role of the courts will be primarily
(a) to determine which kind of privilege is involved, what communica-
tions are within the privilege and who may assert the privilege, (b) to
measure legislative need and relevance, (c) to weigh conflicting inter-
ests, particularly where the specialized privilege requires consideration
on a case-by-case basis, and (d) to determine what protective measures
need to be taken by Congress to protect presidential confidentiality or
the military, diplomatic or national security secrets.
THE AUTHOR
According to a biography furnished by his publisher, Berger was born
in Russia. After coming to this country as a child, he studied to be a
concert violinist. At age 26 he abandoned the concert hall for a legal
career, studying at the University of Cincinnati (A.B. 1932), Northwest-
ern University (J.D. 1935) and Harvard Law School (LL.M. 1938). He
has filled legal positions with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Department of Justice and the Alien Property Custodian, later
engaging in private practice in Washington, D.C. and Chicago. In 1965
Berger retired to devote himself to a study of major legal problems.
Before becoming Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal
History at Harvard Law School, he was Regents Professor of Law at the
University of California at Berkeley.
Mr. Berger's publications are many, including Congress v. The Su-
preme Court (1969) and Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems
(1973). Much of Executive Privilege is based on three of his law review
articles: Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry;' " The Presiden-
tial Monopoly of Foreign Relations." and War-Making by the Presi-
dent.2 " That the first and basic article was written between 1963 and
1965 rebuts any claim that Berger was motivated by politics, rather
17. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
18. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
19. 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1044, 1288 (1965).
20. 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
21. 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29 (1972).
19741 Book Reviews
210 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4
than scholarship, on his writing of Executive Privilege. In addition to
being a revision of those articles, Executive Privilege. includes a chapter,
"The Cost of Secrecy," based on the Pentagon Papers and later sources,
and an "Epilogue," relating to last year's "Nixon Tapes" decision,
Nixon v. Sirica.2 2
Berger has also written many articles on separation of powers and
administrative law subjects.
22. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir 1973)
